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JANUARY, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOUR
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions
and great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors
would pass by because they did not deal with the Constitution, or a telethone company, yet which have in them the germ of some wider theory,
and therefore of some profound interstitial change in the very tissue of
the law.'"-Mr. Justice Holmes, Collected Legal Essays, p. 269.

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI
CASES
MASTER AND SERVANT-BORROWED SERVANT. Karguth
v. Donk Bros. Coal and Coke Co? Recently there have been several decisions by Missouri appellate courts involving the much litigated question
of a "borrowed servant."
The following cases affirmed the action of trial courts in holding
the general master of the servant responsible for the servant's conduct.
In Burke v. Shaw Transfer Co.? the defendant sent two of their
taxicabs with drivers to a funeral at the request of the undertaking firm
of D. W. Newcomer's Sons. One of the drivers negligently injured a
passenger on the return trip from the cementery. The defendant charged
the undertaking firm for the use of the taxicabs with driver and it was
the undertaker in charge of the funeral who directed the plaintiff to enter the taxicab. The judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Kansas
1.

(1923)

253 S. W. 367.

2. (1922)
App. 353.

(39)

243

S.

W.

449,

211

Mo.
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City Court of Appeals on the theory that the driver "was engaged in
the business of his employer."8
In Scherer v. Bryant' the plaintiff as servant of the R. W. Hodge

Company was engaged in banding an armature for defendants. In order
that plaintiff might accomplish his task it was necessary for an engine
to revolve the armature. The engine was operated by engineers of defendants who instructed their engineers to operate the engine on this
occasion under the directions of the employes of the R. W. Hodge Company. The plaintiff was injured by the action of these engineers. The
trial court directed, a verdict for defendants apparently on the theory that
the engineers were at the time in question employes of the R. W. Hodge
Company. But the trial court granted a new trial and this action met the
approval of the Missouri Supreme Court which stated: "The question

is usually one for the jury and is so in this case."
Alexander v. Publishing Co.'

is of the same general nature as the

two decisions above set forth.
The following cases affirmed the action of trial courts in holding
the special master of the servant responsible for the conduct of the
servant.
Grothmann v. Hermann, et al.' is very similar to Burke v. Shaw
Transfer Co., supra. The defendant Hermann was an undertaker who
had charge of and conducted a funeral. He did not have sufficient limousines and hired some with chauffeurs from the Donnelly Undertaking
Company and the Wacker-Helderle Undertaking Company. The plaintiff
while attempting to enter a limousine of the Donnelly company in the
cemetery had her fingers injured by the action of a chauffeur of the
Wacher-Helderle Company slamming a front door of the limousine plaintiff was entering. The St. Louis Court of Appeals sustained the action
of the trial court in setting aside the involuntary nonsuit as to defendant Hermann. The court stated that the chauffeur was under the control
of and doing the work of Hermann.
by
3. What did Arnold J., mean
this statement: "In the case at bar there
is evidence which tends to show joint
control"?
The defendant and the undertaking firm were not in a joint operation. Compare Garven v. C. R. I. &
P. Ry. Co. (1903) 100 Mo. App. 617, 75
S. W. 193.
The case reached the Missouri Supreme Court on certiorari but the writ
was quashed. The Supreme Court ruled
that the* question whether the driver had

changed masters was one of fact for the
jury. State ex rel. v. Trimble (1923)
250 S. W. 384.
4. (1918) 273 Mo. 596, 201 S. W. 900.
5. (1917) 197 Mo. App. 601, 198 S.
W. 467. Hurlbut v. Wabash Ry. Co.
(1895) 130 Mo. 657, 31 S. W. 1051 is a
case where the general master was held
liable to the servant, though the latter
was working more particularly for the
special master at the time.
6. (1922) 241 S. W. 461.
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The foregoing opinion quoted with approval from Simmons v. Murray
and Cudahy Packing Company! The company hired the use of three trucks

and three drivers from Murray during certain parts of the day to take
their employes to and from work. One employe had a finger mashed
when the driver of one truck suddenly backed the truck against a trolley
post. The judgment of the trial court was in favor of the plaintiff
against the packing company but also in favor of Murray. The packing
company appealed but the judgment against it (the special master) was
affirmed. The theory of the Kansas City Court of Appeals was that the
question whose servant was the driver was one for the jury. The reasons given seem to have been (1) that the contract between Murray and
the company was oral and (2) that there was a dispute about the facts.
However, there seems to have been no material dispute concerning anything except the legal rule applicable to the facts.
Karguth v. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co.' presents about the same
sort of a case. The defendant operated about eighteen teams and wagons
of their own. Other persons were given the opportunity of hauling for
defendant when orders were heavy and consequently they would go to
defendant's premises and wait for their opportunity. Cora Maas and
Henry McGinnis operated a wagon and team and sometimes purchased
coal from defendant for delivery to their customers. At other times they
would haul for defendant. On the occasion in question (while hauling a
load of coal for defendant to a customer of defendant) their driver
negligently injured plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict against defendant (the special master). The trial court sustained a motion for a
new trial. The Supreme Court of Missouri directed the trial court to
reinstate the verdict of the jury.
In Holloway v. Schield' the trial court directed a verdict in favor
of defendant Schield but later set aside the order and granted plaintiff a
new trial. The latter action of the trial court was affirmed. In other
words, the Supreme Court of Missouri ruled that the liability of the
special master (Schield) was a question for a jury. The general master
(Fisk) had a garage where Schield kept his automobile. Schield would
drive by the garage and have an employe of Fisk accompany him to
the Buckingham Hotel (where Schield lived) and then the employe would
drive the automobile back to the garage. It was upon such a return trip
that an employe of Fisk negligently injured the plaintiff. Fisk testified,
however, that before Schield made an arrangement with him he made it
clear to Schield that the employe engaged in delivering or returning the
automobile would be Schield's employe for the time being and that
Schield would take the risk of his conduct.
7. (1921)
App. 248.

234 S. W. 1009, 209 Mo.

S.
9.

(1923)
(1922)

253 S. W. 367.
243 S. W. 163, 294 Mo. 512.
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Winkleblock v. Great Western Mfg. Co." and Hilsdorf v. City of
St. Louis, et at." are illustrations of the same point of view.
Healy et al. v. Range Co. 2 is not a clearcut case where an appellate
court reversed the action of a trial court allowing a recovery from the
general master because it is stated that the general master "had not
even loaned its servants." But this was conceded for argument and thus
it may be said that the decision illustrates the fact that it is still possible for a trial court to make an error in submitting to a jury the ques
tion of the responsibility for a servant's conduct where there is both a
general and a special master. In the particular case the defendant brought
an action of replevin and a constable was commanded to take a cooking
stove from plaintiff and deliver it to defendant. At request of the constable the defendant sent two servants to plaintiff's house to get the
stove. The constable had to break into the house. Then he put the
servants to work detaching the stove. The plaintiff protested and one
of the servants committed assault and battery upon her. The Kansas
City Court of Appeals ruled that the servants were the servants of the
constable and not those of the defendant in the particular transaction.
Likewise Garvin v. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co." is not a case where judgment against the general master was entirely disapproved. A new trial
was ordered because the trial court failed to submit an instruction that
directed the jury to consider whether the special master was the master in
control and therefore responsible. The point to be emphasized is that the
court considered the problem to be one for the jury.
But Smith v. St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co!' is a case where the Missouri
Supreme Court by a three to two vote decided that the trial court erred
in failing to give an instruction asked by defendant (the general master)
"virtually withdrawing the case from the jury." The decision turned
very largely, if not entirely, upon the construction of a written contract
between the general and special masters. It is generally said that the
construction of a written instrument belongs to the court."
The problem concerning "borrowed servants" arose in England but
in the earlier cases, at least, there was no disposition to hold that it
should be solved by juries.
In Laugher v. Pointer" the trial judge
directed a nonsuit and later a rule for a new trial was discharged by an
10.

(1916) 187 S. W. 95.
11. (1869) 45 Mo. App. 94, 100 Am.
Dec. 352. Usher v. Telegraph Co. (1906)
122 Mo. App. 98, 98 S. W. 84, seems not
to be a case of a "borrowed servant"
but rather a case where a servant had
two masters.
See Wills v. Railroad
(1908) 133 Mo. App. 625, 113 S. W. 713.

12. (1912) 161 Mo. App. 483, 143 S.
W. 549.
13. (1903) 100 Mo. App. 617, 75 S.
W. 193.
14. (1885) 85 Mo. 418, 55 Am. Rep.
380.
15. Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2556.
16. (1826) 5 B. & C. 547, 8 D. &
R. 556.
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equally divided court. In Quarman v. Burnett" Maule, B., permitted the
jury to render a verdict for plaintiff but the appellate court made absolute a rule for entering a nonsuit. Thus in both cases the effort to hold the
special master failed. Murphy v. Caralli" resulted in a directed nonsuit
and the rule for a new trial was discharged. Thus the plaintiff failed
in his attempt to recover against the general master. The trial court in
Murray v. Currie9 entered a consent verdict for plaintiff but upon appeal a rule was made absolute to enter a nonsuit. Defendant was the
general master of the servant who injured plaintiff. In Rourke v. White
Moss Colliery Co.' a verdict was obtained by plaintiff against defendant,
the general master; but the Common Pleas Division ordered judgment
to be entered for the defendants and this judgment was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
These cases stand in sharp contrast with the prevalent attitude in
Missouri and the United States generally of declaring that the problem
is one of fact for the decision of a jury. The attitude of the English
courts apparently has been to follow the doctrine that if the facts are undisputed the problem is one for the court even though the relationship is
established by oral testimony. This legal principle has been stated to be
the law in Missouri' but seemsto be ignored frequently."
The present state of the law in Missouri seems to be that an appellate
court will uphold the action of a trial court if the latter submits the problem to a jury or decides that it should have done so. Only two or three
cases to the contrary have been discovered and they are not recent decisions. The present tendency seems to be against the idea that the problem should be decided by a court without the assistance of a jury even
though there is no substantial dispute of fact.
0. D. Newlon
0. C. Essman'
17.
18.

19.
20.
21.
App.
22.

(1840) 6 M. & W. 499.
(1864) 3 H. & C. 462.

(1870) L. R. 6 C. P. 24.
(1877) 2 C. P. D. 205.
Kipp v. Oyster (1908) 133 Mo.
711, 716, 114 S. W. 538.
See, for instance, Simmons v.

Murray, et al. (1921) 234 S. W. 1009,
209 Mo. App. 248, where there seems

to be no material dispute as to the facts.
Compare Laugher v. Poiter (1826) 5
B. & C. 547, 8 D. & R. 556.
23. Students, School of Law, University of Missouri.

